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Abstract 
Central America is a microcosm of the opportunities and challenges of small states. Though 
the region’s states have face similar pressures – smallness, proximity to an oft-interventionist 
superpower and myriad transnational challenges – their political and economic developments 
have followed remarkably different paths. The seven small states in the region – Belize, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama – exhibit tremendous 
differences in state capacity, internal security, human development and international influence. 
To understand Central American variation, one must recognise both agency and asymmetry. 
This chapter discusses the historical context of Central American state formation, political 
development and international relations. We then turn to the domestic and international 
characteristics and challenges of these states before assessing their abilities to affect domestic 
developments and international contexts. 
Keywords: Central America, asymmetry, agency, small states, development, security 
Introduction 
 
The seven states of Central America often portray themselves as a bridge: between North and 
South America and between the Atlantic and Pacific, which the Central American isthmus 
divided with a strip of land that is, at points, only some 50 kilometres wide. Although the region 
is, in English-language commentary, often used to invoke poverty, state weakness and external 
intervention, a closer examination reveals just how much variation Central America holds. 
What economic historian Victor Bulmer-Thomas (1987, p. xiv) wrote three decades ago still 
holds “the region exhibits both conformity and diversity and the problem facing an author is to 
see the one without losing sight of the other.”  
Central America is a microcosm of the opportunities and challenges of small states and its 
diversity offers a great deal to their study. The region’s states faced similar pressures - 
smallness, proximity to an oft-interventionist superpower and myriad transnational challenges 
- their political and economic developments have followed remarkably different paths. In the 
most basic terms, the richest Central American country (Panama) has a per capita income 
nearly seven times higher than the poorest (Nicaragua), a disparity that mirrors the divide 
between Latvia and Timor-Leste. Divergent paths are reflected in tremendous differences in 
state capacity, internal security, human development and international influence. This variation 
has been affected, but not determined, by great powers. To understand Central American 
variation, one must understand both agency and asymmetry. 
All seven states in the region – Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua and Panama – can be understood as small states under the definition used in this 
volume: they are constrained by limited domestic size and capacities and are shaped by their 
role as weaker partners in asymmetrical international relationships (see Table 1). In this 
chapter, we briefly discuss the historical context of Central American state formation, political 
development and international relations. We then turn to the domestic and international 
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characteristics and challenges of these states before assessing their abilities to affect domestic 
developments and international contexts. 















 Belize 360,346 22,806  4,905 Belize dollar 1981  
Costa Rica 4,930,258 51,060  11,630 Colón 1821c  
El Salvador 6,172,011 20,721  3,889 US dollar 1821c  
Guatemala 15,460,732 107,159  4,470 Quetzal 1821c  
Honduras 9,038,741 111,890  2,480 Lempira 1821c  
Nicaragua  6,025,951 119,990  2,221 Córdoba 1821c  
 Panama  3,753,142 74,340  15,087 
Balboa/US 
dollar 1903  
a Source: CIA World Factbook 
b Source: World Bank national accounts, current US$ 
c Independence from Spain as Central American Federation; formal independence under current names c. 1838. 
Historical background 
 
With the exception of Belize, which became a British possession and only gained independence 
in 1981, the states of Central America were Spanish colonies. Before colonisation, the regions 
to the north had large and advanced indigenous civilisations, primarily Mayan. The southern 
region of the isthmus was home to important though smaller coastal indigenous communities. 
Colonisation and the slave trade led to transnational Afro-Caribbean communities that predate 
nation-state borders. Social marginalisation of both meso-American indigenous and black 
populations remains a core social challenge. The isthmus was largely a colonial backwater, 
despite scattered mining. However, narrow sections of the isthmus were important entrepôts 
and connections for the transport of goods from the Pacific Coast of South America to the 
metropole. This created coastal elites in a few places, notably in what would become Panama.  
If the history of colonial control was broadly similar, Central American states had different 
patterns of experiences in the immediate post-independence period. Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica gained independence alongside Mexico, and were briefly 
claimed as part of the new Mexican Empire. After the fall of the Mexican emperor Agustín 
Iturbide, those states formed the Central American Federation centred in Guatemala City. The 
federation was never cohesive, but gained international recognition from the British and United 
States (Smith, 1963) before effectively dissolving in the late 1830s. As the former colonial 
administrative centre and largest province, Guatemala led the federation; Costa Rica remained 
most distant (Soto, 1991). Conversely, Panama became part of Simón Bolívar’s Gran 
Colombia, and later part Colombia. It would not gain independence for another eight decades. 
Intra-Central American rivalries were common, as were feuds between Liberals and 
Conservatives, indigenous and criollos, and landlords and peasants. Forced plantation labour 
and press-ganged military and militia service were a common, and resented, form of repression 
of the indigenous population at independence and a century afterwards (Dunkerley, 1988, pp. 
4–16). 
National integration, initially minimal, gradually emerged in the late 19th century, led in part 
by export-driven coffee plantations under a new market-driven elite. Mahoney (2001) 
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emphasises this period as formative, though with different effects among the Central American 
republics. The small states’ domestic disputes invited external meddling, despite minimal 
resources and scant markets. Central America was as an important site of US-British 
contestation, as well as US expansionist tendencies, including armed interventions by privately 
financed “filibusters” during the mid-19th century, some of whom hoped to bring Central 
America into the United States as slave states (Findling, 1987; Leonard, 1991, pp. 15-34). Less 
noted is that the states often intervened in one another’s affairs, leading occasionally to war. 
The state-to-state Anglo-American contest focused on dreams of an interoceanic canal. An 
emerging regional parity was marked by the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, in which the US and 
Britain agreed to the joint construction and control of any future canal; and signed without 
Central American backing (Bourne, 1961; Findling, 1987) However, that treaty soon came 
under pressure from the US public and nationalist politicians little disposed to legitimise British 
power so close to US shores (Sexton, 2011). US economic influence was expanding quickly, 
notably through Cornelius Vanderbilt’s and Minor Keith’s railroads and investments (Findling, 
1987; Greene, 2009). That later would lead to the long-influential United Fruit Company 
presence in the region. Still, British influence persevered, with formal empire in Belize and a 
broader coastal protectorate covering parts of Nicaragua and Honduras.  
Growing US power and expansionism after the Civil War renewed clashes and by the 1890s, 
the British were retrenching and “passing the baton” in Central America to the assertive United 
States. US diplomats continued denouncing the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty while making 
entreaties to Central Americans for canal rights on their own terms (Findling, 1987, pp. 36-40; 
Zeren & Hall, 2016). The British finally acquiesced, and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1900 
gave the United States unilateral rights for canal construction, signalling a definitive shift in 
power. The effect of the power transition for Central Americans was ambivalent. Both the 
British and the Americans were disdainful of Central American sovereignty when it impinged 
on their investments or security concerns. Ultimately, though, the US role would be 
transformative. As a proximate power, the US became an arbiter of domestic disputes. This 
role was enforced by frequent Marine deployments and several long-lasting occupations, 
especially in Nicaragua (McPherson, 2014). But the most enduring exercise of US power was 
to support Panamanian independence from Colombia in tacit exchange for an unequal treaty to 
build a canal and establish a military and administrative presence in the heart of the new country 
(Major, 1993). The US role reshaped Central American institutions in far-reaching ways: with 
stated progressive aims, the United States advocated elections (of questionable fairness) and 
professionalised national militaries to replace militias (Schoultz, 2018). Given the weakness of 
counterweights, militaries became crucial powerbrokers in Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
El Salvador, and (somewhat later) Panama, independently or in collaboration with economic 
elites. Only Costa Rica largely avoided the curse of military rule (Pérez, 2015).  
Most of Central America followed the United States into World War I with nominal 
declarations of war (Rinke, 2017). Their links to the US economy made the Great Depression 
a punishing experience, but one that spurred urbanisation and social transformation. The region 
again followed the United States into World War II despite some authoritarian leaders’ initial 
fascist sympathies and important German populations. Proximity and wartime concentration 
weighed heavily. The contrast between purported democratic war aims and US-friendly 
authoritarian rulers sat uneasily with a nascent urban class. Combined with post-war economic 
pressures, anti-dictatorial movements emerged (Bethell & Roxborough, 1997; Leonard, 1984). 
Most importantly, one movement unseated military rulers in Guatemala and elected centre-left 
leaders. For a brief period, these democrats organised a feared, if somewhat exaggerated, 
“Caribbean Legion” to topple authoritarians (Ameringer, 2010; Moulton, 2015). Soon, the 
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rising Cold War tide swamped this democratic spring. In 1954, Guatemalan President Jacobo 
Arbenz was ousted in a CIA-sponsored coup, returning the country to conservative civil-
military dominance (Gleijeses, 1991).  
The first decades of the Cold War, then, were marked by military rule. This was dynastic and 
personalist in Nicaragua, and by civil-military junta in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. 
Panama experienced a rotation of populist elected presidents and elite-backed military coups 
under the shadow of the massive US presence, until a reformist military dictator took power in 
1968. Again, only Costa Rica escaped, establishing a tradition of pragmatic, democratic 
centrism after a brief but bloody civil war in 1948 (Longley, 1997). Some regional cooperation 
re-emerged, namely the Central American Common Market, during the 1960s; but it was 
undermined by a 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras. Integration would be 
reactivated in the 1990s with greater economic effects (Bulmer-Thomas, 1998).   
If relative dictatorial stability marked the first two decades of the Cold War, the subsequent 
two decades saw explosive revolutionary and reactionary ferment; a Cold War frontline seen 
by Washington as crucial to reversing Soviet-Cuban gains. This was concentrated in Nicaragua, 
El Salvador and Guatemala, where civil wars led to hundreds of thousands of deaths during the 
1970s and 1980s (LeoGrande, 1998; Rabe, 2011). In Nicaragua, the armed left gained power 
in 1979, but faced a US-backed counterrevolutionary attack (Pastor, 2002). El Salvador 
experienced death-squad violence amid shifting, military-dominated governments (Crandall, 
2016). An outcast Guatemalan government launched a genocide against its largely indigenous 
peasantry despite the dubious threat from the armed left. Honduras remained under military 
rule, hosting large US security deployments. Panama’s military rule became more reactionary 
and corrupt with the ascension of Manuel Noriega (Scranton, 1991). Costa Rica retained its 
democracy and played an outsized role in trying to mediate its neighbours’ wars, sometimes 
putting it at odds with the United States (Aravena, 1989; Meyer, 1992). 
The end of the Cold War ended Soviet and Cuban support and, more importantly, diminished 
the force of anti-communism on the right (Brands, 2010; Pastor & Long, 2010; Rabe, 2011). 
Later investigations showed that right-wing governments, militaries, and their shadowy allies 
were responsible for the vast majority of killings in Central America during these turbulent 
decades. Within a matter of years, intractable conflicts ended, elections were held, and formally 
democratic governments came to power in every country in Central America (Leogrande, 
1990). In most cases, this was accompanied by a program of economic liberalisation (Lehoucq, 
2012); the six Spanish-speaking countries launched the Central American Integration System 
(SICA) in 1991, promoting liberalisation and intra-regional trade (Sánchez, 2010).  
Democratisation was celebrated, but it was clearly inadequate. Deep divisions remained, both 
in politics and socio-economically. In macroeconomic terms, “Most economies of the isthmus 
have fallen behind since 1980” (Lehoucq 2011, pp. 98). Greater external openness and some 
successes in export diversification and attracting investment have not produced per capita 
growth in most countries (Condo, Colburn, & Rivera, 2005, pp. 5–7). There has been little 
redress of the socio-economic inequalities that broadened the revolutionary left’s appeal. Many 
high-level officials involved in the conflicts’ massive human rights violations have escaped 
justice, despite truth commissions and transitional justice frameworks.  
Domestic characteristics 
Elections and formal democratisation have not been a panacea for Central Americans. The 
supposed benefits of smallness for democratic communalism – proximity to and accountability 
of ruling elites – do not materialise when societies are so unequal that the majority is 
marginalised from the democratic process. To a great extent, that has been the case in 
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Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua; in El Salvador, economic improvements have been offset 
by skyrocketing crime. Both in terms of democracy and economic growth, Costa Rica and 
Panama have performed relatively well. Elsewhere, as Lehoucq (2011, p. 118) notes, 
democracy “has fused with some blatantly autocratic elements in the other republics of the 
isthmus.” In recent years, elections have become less clean, particularly in Honduras and 
Nicaragua, and the playing field is heavily tilted. In Central America’s poorest and most 
unequal states, democratic governance has done little to reduce poverty or improve the lives of 
most citizens. Inequality in the region has barely budged since 1980, despite modest 
improvements in extreme poverty rates and some social and health indicators (Lehoucq 2011, 
pp. 129-131), threatening to undermine satisfaction with democracy.  
Central American states are marked (with important variation) by limited state capacity 
(Schneider, 2012). This has been exacerbated by recurrent inter-branch conflicts, sometimes 
solved through extra-institutional means (Lehoucq 2011, pp. 124-127). Politics are often 
marked by deep cleavages among the small elite groups, to the extent that high politics at times 
sparks notable intra-family divisions. While the smallness of this elite group can be 
exaggerated—references to the “14 families” in El Salvador remain a common trope—it is the 
case that Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras are deeply unequal societies where 
both political and economic power are restricted to a narrow stratum. Even in wealthier Panama 
and Costa Rica, with more effective states, smallness means that elite circles are notably 
narrow. This has shaped government policies that “grant particularistic benefits to narrow 
groups” with taxation schemes “pocked full of particularistic holes” (Schneider 2012, p. 7).  
Weak, elite-dominated state and fiscal structures have limited the development of a positive 
role for the state in society. With the exception of Costa Rica, Central American states spend 
far about half on social programs than their Latin American counterparts, per capita. For 
Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua, this figure has usually sat near 25 percent of the regional 
average (Lehoucq 2011, p. 130). This continued low social spending bucks a post-
democratisation Latin American trend of greater expenditures, reduced extreme poverty, and 
better social outcomes in many countries (Levy & Schady, 2013). Smallness has meant that 
external actors have played outsize roles in shaping domestic policies. The United States and 
the Pan American Union, and even private foundations, played major roles shaping social 
policy. Today, international financial institutions, including the Inter-American Development 
Bank, compensate for low policy-planning capacity. However, external involvement has been 
a poor substitute for elite commitment to state institutions, with tax revenues as a percentage 
of GDP staying below the global average, with the exception of Belize. Outside of Costa Rica, 
states are “organisationally primitive” with “bureaucracies of inferior quality” that are highly 
subject to partisan vices (Lehoucq 2011, pp. 146-148). This weakness has exacerbated a 
number of the challenges the region’s states face, discussed below. 
Challenges  
In domestic policy, the states of Central America share some common challenges, plus 
particular ones driven by differentiated levels of economic development. These include 
poverty, low human development, inequality, corruption, gender-based discrimination, and 
violence. Inequality, corruption, and violence also pose challenges to effective democratic 
governance in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Belize. Panama and Costa Rica face many 
challenges from their neighbours, though both still suffer high inequality exacerbated by 
rural/urban divisions. Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador have only a fraction 
of the per capita income as their richer southern neighbours, while being characterised by 
similar maldistribution. These states rank near the bottom of the UN Human Development 
Index and have struggled to improve economic performance despite liberal macroeconomic 
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reforms that pleased international markets. The countries lack major industries and the 
environment for small business is disastrous: high insecurity, including extortion of small 
business owners, little certainty regarding rule of law, and weak domestic demand.  
In addition, Nicaragua and Honduras face problems of democratic breakdown linked to 
incumbent authoritarianism. While Honduras democratised at the end of the Cold War, its elite 
structure shifted little and its military remained closely tied to politics (Pérez, 2015, Chapter 
3). This became evident in 2009 when civilian elites and military officials conspired to oust 
elected President Manuel Zelaya, fearful of his drift to the left and plans to hold a referendum 
to remove presidential term limits. Political uncertainty struck again in 2018, when 
conservative incumbent Juan Orlando Hernández, having removed the prohibition on re-
election without upsetting his right-wing allies, faced a closely disputed election against a 
leftist newcomer. With the election marked by major irregularities, Hernández closed ranks 
with the US government and security forces to thwart the electoral challenge and defy 
international pressure. The election and ensuing dispute were marked by deadly violence. In 
Nicaragua, former left-wing guerrilla Daniel Ortega returned to power via fair elections in 
2006; but, as President, he has steadily undermined checks and balances while using quasi-
legal tools to decimate the opposition. In 2018, responding to street protests, initially against 
social service cuts, his government resorted to state and para-state violence. Unlike the 
conservative, pro-US Hernández in Honduras, Ortega has faced US sanctions. While 
preserving formal democratic institutions and conducting elections, both have effectively 
undermined democracy and weakened already poor governance.  
All the countries under review face problematic levels of corruption and growing levels of 
violence; but these problems are much worse in northern Central America. Violence has 
tormented Honduras and El Salvador, which have alternately suffered the world’s highest per 
capita homicide rate in recent years. Sky-high murder rates, facilitated by impunity so 
widespread that virtually no one is prosecuted for murder, have made northern Central America 
as deadly as during the civil war period (Arnson & Olson, 2011). While much lower than 
Honduras and El Salvador, Guatemala and Belize have homicide rates several times the global 
average. Relatively peaceful Costa Rica and Panama have also seen growing problems of 
criminality, some of it with transnational dimensions. The violence is, in part, fuelled by 
transnational drug and arms trafficking, though it has deep roots in local problems and state 
weakness; and, in many cases, state complicity (Wolf, 2016). Violence and dismal economic 
prospects, fuel outmigration from northern Central America, which has complicated relations 
with their neighbors and the United States (Clemens, 2017; Swanson & Torres, 2016). 
While the roots of this violence are complex, the size of the nations involved has complicated 
attempts to address it. Small domestic security institutions lack capacity; to gain capacity (and 
funding) they have looked abroad, sometimes in unison. The Honduran, Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran presidents launched an intermittent joint lobbying effort in recent years. While they 
gained attention in Washington, political support, and some new resources, what they (and their 
US counterparts) lacked was new ideas about how to deal with the problems bedevilling their 
countries. Nor is it clear that these leaders had the political will to tackle widespread impunity. 
Honduran and Guatemalan political elites have sought to disrupt international anti-corruption 
agencies (discussed below). Both countries’ leaderships, along with El Salvador’s, have 
undermined the rule of law to protect their own governments and the families of top leadership 
implicated in corruption. High-income Panama has also seen expansive corruption scandals, 
involving both its role as a shady centre for global tax evasion as evidenced in the Panama 
Papers, and of its political class; this has led to the prosecution of former president Ricardo 
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Martinelli in 2018. Costa Rica has largely remained at the margins of this region-wide 
epidemic.  
International characteristics 
As noted in the introduction to this volume, small states are gripped by the dilemma of gaining 
influence through alignment with great powers versus trying to maintain maximum autonomy. 
In the shadow of the United States, Central American states face an extreme version of this 
problem. Historically, almost all governments opted for at least tacit alignment (with notable 
exceptions like Nicaragua’s Sandinistas) with Great Britain and then with the United States. 
Some leaders played the card of explicit pro-US alignment against their domestic opponents 
(Clark, 1992); only a few tried to maintain a delicate balance. Today, despite tends towards 
global multipolarity, Central America remains closely connected to the US. While those 
connections were once largely political, military, and via exports, today they run much deeper. 
Central American economies are highly interdependent with the US; their societies are linked 
through migration; and their security problems are deeply connected with transnational, US-
tied illicit markets. 
Given that context, it is perhaps unsurprising that these countries’ foreign policies are deeply 
focused on Washington and profoundly impacted by this asymmetrical relationship. Central 
America’s foreign policy concentration on Washington has rarely been reciprocated during the 
post-Cold War period. Before that, US attention was intense but sporadic, driven by a 
“whirlpool” of US perceptions of crisis and threat (Pastor, 2001). Furthermore, many of Central 
Americans’ top concerns with the United States are seen by US politicians as essentially 
domestic—notably the status of large Central American migrant communities.  
US-centrism exists economically as well. The economic relationship has been formalised in a 
free trade agreement between the region and the United States: the US-Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (referred to as CAFTA or CAFTA-DR). However, that 
trade pact captures only one aspect of economic interdependence – perhaps dependence for the 
northern states – on the United States. Remittances have been central to bilateral relations: as 
much as 20 percent of El Salvador’s GDP has come from remittances in recent years, almost 
entirely from Salvadorans in the United States. This creates a vulnerability unique to small 
states in highly asymmetrical relationships. Seemingly minor changes in US domestic policy – 
such as the cancellation of certain protected immigration statuses – send economic and social 
shockwaves through the smaller country (Rathod, Stinchcomb, Garcia, et al., 2017). It adds to 
small states’ vulnerability to external economic fluctuations, particularly US recessions, 
Federal Reserve borrowing rates and the price of oil, for which Central America is almost 
entirely dependent on imports. 
One often overlooked aspect of this asymmetrical relationship is how it extends beyond 
executive branch diplomacy. Because Central America is usually a peripheral concern for the 
White House, individual members of Congress play outsized roles in the making of Central 
America policy. On the left, a handful of Congresspeople, in conjunction with human rights 
and labour NGOS, have sought to condition economic and security assistance and trade 
preferences on improvements in rights protections. On the right, vestiges of the 1980s anti-
communist coalition and antagonists of Cuba’s communist government denounce anything that 
resembles a leftward drift. In 2009, this translated into outspoken support from members of 
Congress for the military coup in Honduras (Ruhl, 2010). Powerful Congresspeople use their 
perches to shape consequential bureaucratic politics of the State Department, Pentagon, and 
Drug Enforcement Agency. 
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In one respect, at least, the vision of Central America as single-commodity exporters – 
pejoratively, ‘banana republics’ – is seriously out of date. While coffee, bananas, and other 
agricultural goods remain important, for much of Central America light manufacturing is now 
a greater source of exports and employment. Three-quarters of El Salvador’s exports are 
manufactures. For Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras, the figure is nearly half. Central 
America is linked into global value chains much more deeply. Traditionally, manufacturing 
was focused on textiles, though investment has expanded several other internationalised 
enclaves of the economy. Costa Rica has upgraded to higher value-added exports and is known 
as a hub for computer giant Intel. Panama focuses on service exports connected to shipping, 
insurance, logistics, and banking, which have driven one of the Latin America’s highest growth 
rates and made it one of the region’s wealthiest per capita economies.  
The region has at times attempted to rebalance its diplomatic relations to counteract the 
centrality of the northern power. Given its unique role in global trade transport, Panama has 
been, in many ways, the most globalised and cosmopolitan of the Central American countries. 
Costa Rica has also expanded and upgraded its diplomatic representation, and it has sought to 
play niche roles in international diplomacy. Mexico remains an important player in the north 
of Central America, particularly as it tightens controls over migration and illicit flows at its 
own southern border (Wilson & Valenzuela, 2014). Regional dynamics of migration have made 
Mexico both the major transit country and a destination for Central American migrants. 
Central America has occasionally tried to revive aspects of its early 19th century confederation 
and to engage in regional and sub-regional organisations. Like two centuries ago, it has done 
so in ways that place few limits on state autonomy (Legler, 2013). Central American states 
have been active in the Organization of American States, though along as Malamud (2015) has 
argued, the most important role of this engagement has often been to provide legitimacy for 
incumbents in their domestic contexts. While a logic exists for small states to unite and improve 
their bargaining positions vis-à-vis their larger neighbors, that has rarely occurred in practice. 
Instead, Central American regionalism has often advanced with the participation or at least 
encouragement of the United States; such as under CAFTA. Without external impetus, Central 
American economies had largely been too small and concentrated to make integration a 
consistent priority, but that has somewhat changed over the past two decades. The revitalised 
Central American Common Market has lowered external tariffs and signed several free trade 
and investment agreements, including a 2012 association agreement with the European Union. 
Like many small states during recent decades, Central Americans have bet on a strategy of 
economic openness and integration with the global economy (Booth, Wade, & Walker, 2014). 
The region has occasionally turned to global international organisations in search of influence 
and support, and to avoid the heavy hand of the US in bilateral relations. From 1989-1992, UN 
peacekeeping played an important role in the implementation of regional accords to end the 
civil conflicts (Koops, 2014). During the ensuing transitions to democracy, international 
election monitoring was a crucial part of achieving buy-in from formerly warring parties (Farer, 
1996). Building on these experiences, Central Americans turned to international organisations 
to combat corruption and impunity. The most innovative effort was the International 
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en 
Guatemala, or CICIG). Granted unprecedented powers in Guatemala’s legal system, the 
commission launched investigations and brought cases against powerful figures (Gutiérrez, 
2016; Krylova, 2018). This made enemies in the political elite, spurring a clash with President 
Jimmy Morales. In response to similar problems in Honduras, public pressure forced the 
government to accept an OAS-led Support Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in 
Honduras (Misión de Apoyo contra la Corrupción y la Impunidad in Honduras, or MACCIH). 
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However, facing stronger and more cohesive elite opposition, this body never gained CICIG’s 
powers, and entrenched elites set out to hobble it from its inception (Call, 2018). 
Another important issue - in which smallness has been central - has been the One China Policy. 
For decades, Central America was a key reservoir of support for Taiwan/Republic of China. 
This was influenced by US pressure, especially from pro-Taiwan conservatives in Congress, 
by domestic anti-communist forces, and by economic statecraft (including now-exposed 
bribery). However, in 2007, Costa Rica changed its recognition to the People’s Republic of 
China, lured by hundreds of millions of dollars in projects and trade. Central American 
countries began to re-evaluate their pro-Taiwanese positions. In 2017, Panama recognised the 
People’s Republic of China; in 2018, El Salvador announced it would change its recognition 
(Tudoroiu, 2017). While Panama’s announcement largely escaped censure, El Salvador was 
criticised by some in the US Congress, namely Senator Marco Rubio, who threatened to 
withhold aid. The US ambassador followed suit (Harris, 2018). Such is the asymmetry between 
the US and El Salvador that US officials insist San Salvador refuse to recognize the world’s 
second largest economy: forty years after the United States changed its own recognition policy!  
Challenges 
Central American states face a host of international and transnational challenges. While many 
are not strictly related to size – larger states like Colombia and Mexico also face aspects of the 
same problems – asymmetry shapes the challenges and the options for response.  
Transnational organised crime is the paradigmatic case. The very nature of this problem is 
shaped by asymmetry. Most ‘product,’ whether cocaine or trafficked persons, originates in 
weaker countries, destined for the larger markets of the United States, Europe, and increasingly 
Asia. The policy paradigm to address these illicit markets primarily originated in the large, 
powerful countries—though the elites of small Central American states have usually embraced 
militarised responses (Wolf, 2017). The major exception to this pattern regards the arms trade; 
many weapons used by illicit actors originate in legal or grey markets in the United States, 
which refuses to aggressively address the problem for domestic political reasons. The problem 
of illicit actors and violence is not a problem of smallness per se (Panama, Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica have been less affected); however, it is certainly a problem of asymmetries. For Central 
America, this asymmetry is even more complex; not only are these states in a weak position 
vis-à-vis the US, but they suffer the effects of changing enforcement in Mexico and Colombia. 
Central America’s role has largely been as a transhipment point; due to its geography and low 
state capacity, trafficking through the region boomed when neighbouring Colombia and 
Mexico increased pressure on illicit groups. Some of these groups expanded operations in 
Central America to compensate (Dudley, 2011). The history of armed conflicts meant there 
were individuals experienced in violence and available, if dated, arms. 
Though the image of mega-cartels that rival small states in their financing and armed force 
lingers, the reality of transnational organised crime has largely changed. Under a relentless, if 
ultimately counterproductive, attack on top leadership, large organisations have fragmented 
into smaller, locally oriented groups. While this largely was the intention of the so-called 
“kingpin” or “decapitation” policy, the effects have been disastrous. Local authorities were no 
better prepared to address smaller groups, who were often more violent in their competition for 
market share (Phillips, 2015). With less access to lucrative transnational shipment of drugs, 
their criminal activities have been locally pernicious. New fragments joined existing local 
gangs, especially in Honduras and El Salvador. Those gangs, called maras, are themselves 
connected to international asymmetries: founding members were deported from US cities, and 
they brought US gang cultures to Central American streets, where poverty and economic 
marginalisation created large pools of potential recruits (Wolf, 2017). Transnational 
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connections increased the flow of funds and drugs into local markets. In some cases, this has 
increased the ability to corrupt officials; in many others, state security forces have themselves 
become key operators in illicit markets. In extreme cases, police units have acted as murder 
squads for organised crime, with high-level involvement. 
The limited resources of the small Central American states have made them dependent on 
external assistance to combat this wave of violence. Since 2008, this has been linked to the US-
funded Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), which has funnelled hundreds 
of millions of dollars to Central America. While meant to balance security and social programs, 
most funding has gone to security. Signs of increased US presence have been notable; most 
tragically, this included a May 2012 shootout in which US-assisted Honduras security forces 
killed a group of civilians. The US DEA was faulted in US government reports for poor 
practices and covering up its misdeeds.  
Not all Central America’s challenges are related to external asymmetries. The region faces 
vulnerabilities of environmental precariousness, linked to geographical smallness. The small 
countries have long faced difficulties in diversifying agricultural production, developing food 
self-sufficiency, and (especially in heavily populated El Salvador), meeting demands for arable 
land. These problems are complicated by anthropogenic climate change. Geography, poverty, 
and poor governance have made the region susceptible to natural disasters, especially 
hurricanes, earthquakes, and (in places) volcanic eruptions. Today, rising sea levels and 
flooding are near-term challenges, exacerbated by poor land use and conservation, leading to 
deadly catastrophes.  
Conclusion: Pawns or powers? 
 
The region’s history highlights its vulnerability to external intervention. This shaped 
fundamental trajectories of Central American states: the independence of Panama, three 
decades of occupation in Nicaragua leading to an authoritarian dynasty, the overthrow of 
elected democracy in Guatemala, and the toppling of a dictator in Panama in 1990 (Rosenberg 
& Solís, 2012). Smallness made these interventions feasible for the great power, seemingly 
reducing the costs of action (though only in the short term). The feasibility of intervention 
meant that actors in Central American states looked to outside powers to resolve disputes or 
strengthen their hand against domestic opponents; this had deep, though hard to measure, 
effects on state-building projects at home. They also at times armed one another’s domestic 
opponents and militarised intra-Central America disputes.  
Still, there are important examples of effective action by Central American states. In some 
ways, Costa Rica has been nearest the role of the active small state that is highlighted in the 
literature. In the midst of Cold War pressures, astute Costa Rican statesmanship allowed the 
country to insulate itself from global and regional pressures, pursuing its own successful path 
(Longley, 1997). It sought out roles as an international mediator, most notably in the Central 
American conflicts of the 1980s. Taking advantage of its history of democratic practice in a 
region known for the opposite, Costa Rica has been a pro-democracy voice in the region and 
further afield. Likewise, it has drawn on its reputation for ecological tourism to play a more 
active role in international conversations around sustainable development. In another signal 
case, during the 1970s, persistent Panamanian pressure and an astute use of allies led to the 
reversion of the Panama Canal under favourable conditions (Long, 2014). Panama later resisted 
US pressures to maintain a substantial military presence in the Canal Zone; after nearly a 
century, US troops left Panama. Today Panama positions itself economically as a Central 
 11 
American Singapore, though it faces growing international pressures over secretive banking 
practice, tax avoidance, and money laundering.  
These instances suggest that international legal recognition, and the recourse it provided to 
international institutions, can provide useful tools for small states. However, it is clearly not 
sufficient. There are fewer and less notable examples of successes for the northern Central 
American countries. International influence has largely been factional. Honduras, for example, 
has successfully attracted resources, both military and humanitarian, from the US, but these 
have done little to improve general conditions there. During the 1980s, the Guatemalan 
government resisted international pressures; but it did so to carry out a genocide in the name 
of anti-communism. Nicaragua shunned US pressures during the 1980s with limited support 
from Cuba and the Soviet Union; it has done so again since the 2006 return of Daniel Ortega, 
initially with assistance from Venezuela. This has made the country a pariah, not an influential 
international actor. 
In recent years, Central American leaders have attempted to increase cooperation. One impetus 
was economic. Central America gained substantial preferential access to the US market under 
the 1982 Caribbean Basin Initiative. However, businesses in the region wanted additional 
security for a broader range of exports; a free trade agreement also would lock in liberalisation 
and secure future market access. The proposed agreement provoked domestic division, but 
Central American governments strongly supported the proposal (Condo et al., 2005). The US 
responded positively in 2001, but complex US domestic politics on trade, and particularly 
Democratic opposition due to poor conditions for organised labour and environmentalists in 
much of Central America, delayed Congressional approval for years. Central America’s 
“collective power” (Long, 2017b) seemed to bring positive effects under the Obama 
administration. Initially hesitant, the administration supported CAFTA in Congress. The US 
encouraged joint action from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, hoping it would lead to 
reforms that would stem violence and northward migration; particularly of unaccompanied 
minors.  
Cooperation has continued, but the results under the Trump administration have been less 
positive. Perhaps the most important case study regards these countries’ diasporas in the US. 
Hundreds of thousands of Central American migrants lived in the US under the administrative 
designation of Temporary Protected Status. Despite the name, the status had been extended for 
decades, allowing migrants to work legally (and send remittances). Despite intense lobbying 
and attempts to ingratiate themselves to Trump – Honduras and El Salvador relocated their 
embassies to Jerusalem to back the controversial US move – the Trump administration 
cancelled TPS, setting up potential mass repatriations to countries ill prepared to reintegrate 
citizens (Rathod, Stinchcomb, De Luna, et al., 2017; Rathod, Stinchcomb, Garcia, et al., 2017). 
This underscores how US-Central American asymmetrical interdependence converts Central 
America’s most pressing foreign policy issues into “intermestic” challenges that touch 
sensitive aspects of US domestic politics. Small size makes gaining US high-level policy 
attention difficult, while the issues’ nature often draws in Congressional and bureaucratic 
opponents (Long, 2017a). 
Given their similar histories and external conditions, but variation of social, political, and 
foreign policy outcomes, Central America should provide a rich area of study for students of 
small states in International Relations. The cases may be ideal for the middle-range theory the 
editors of this volume advocate (Baldacchino & Wivel, 2020). However, the region has 
garnered comparatively little attention from authors using a small states framework, perhaps 
due to the history and perception of US intervention. Certainly, international pressures have 
constrained foreign policy options, just as they have shaped the domestic political and 
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economic trajectories of these countries. But, as this chapter sketches, those pressures have not 
prevented diversity from emerging. Central America, then, reinforces the notion that effective 
international action requires effective governance at home. However, it shows this more 
through intra-regional variation than through generalisations about the region as a whole. In 
short, some small states in the region have historically maintained relatively strong state 
institutions. They have generally managed to pursue their interests effectively, despite difficult 
international constraints. However, for states that have lacked domestic capacity, the 
combination of smallness and weakness has led to incoherent international action at best and 
invitations (at times literal) for external intervention at worst. Small does not mean weak; 
however, small and weak almost certainly do mean vulnerable.  
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